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Abstract
Background: Mathematical and computational models for infectious diseases are increasingly used to support
public-health decisions; however, their reliability is currently under debate. Real-time forecasts of epidemic spread
using data-driven models have been hindered by the technical challenges posed by parameter estimation and
validation. Data gathered for the 2009 H1N1 influenza crisis represent an unprecedented opportunity to validate
real-time model predictions and define the main success criteria for different approaches.
Methods: We used the Global Epidemic and Mobility Model to generate stochastic simulations of epidemic spread
worldwide, yielding (among other measures) the incidence and seeding events at a daily resolution for 3,362
subpopulations in 220 countries. Using a Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood analysis, the model provided an
estimate of the seasonal transmission potential during the early phase of the H1N1 pandemic and generated
ensemble forecasts for the activity peaks in the northern hemisphere in the fall/winter wave. These results were
validated against the real-life surveillance data collected in 48 countries, and their robustness assessed by focusing
on 1) the peak timing of the pandemic; 2) the level of spatial resolution allowed by the model; and 3) the clinical
attack rate and the effectiveness of the vaccine. In addition, we studied the effect of data incompleteness on the
prediction reliability.
Results: Real-time predictions of the peak timing are found to be in good agreement with the empirical data,
showing strong robustness to data that may not be accessible in real time (such as pre-exposure immunity and
adherence to vaccination campaigns), but that affect the predictions for the attack rates. The timing and spatial
unfolding of the pandemic are critically sensitive to the level of mobility data integrated into the model.
Conclusions: Our results show that large-scale models can be used to provide valuable real-time forecasts of
influenza spreading, but they require high-performance computing. The quality of the forecast depends on the
level of data integration, thus stressing the need for high-quality data in population-based models, and of
progressive updates of validated available empirical knowledge to inform these models.
Keywords: computational epidemiology, H1N1 influenza pandemic, prediction, validation.
Background
Over the past 10 years, the real-world accuracy of mathe-
matical and computational models (MCMs) used in epi-
demiology has been considerably improved by the
integration of large-scale datasets and explicit simulations
of entire populations down to the scale of single indivi-
duals [1-9]. MCMs have gained in importance in the
public-health domain, especially in infectious disease epi-
demiology, by providing rationales and quantitative ana-
lysis to support decision-making and policy-making
processes [5,6,10-15]. Although there are contrasting opi-
nions among modelers about the value of MCMs in epi-
demiology [16], many researchers advocate the use of
these models as predictive tools [17].
With regard to modeling, it is important to distinguish
between two different types of predictions [18]. The first
class of predictions, or projections, offered by models is
the classic scenario and ‘what if’ analysis. In this case,
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prototypical values for the basic disease parameters and
other key parameters, such as time of implementation of
specific policies, are assumed in the MCM to produce
plausible scenarios for the epidemics and to evaluate con-
tainment/mitigation procedures as a function of the
explored parameter space. Over the past few years, a large
body of work has been published, aimed at informing con-
tingency plans for pandemic preparedness [19-24].
A more difficult challenge compared with scenario
analysis is the use of MCMs for the real-time forecasting
of unfolding epidemics. It must also be said that fore-
casting approaches contain a number of assumptions,
such as those introduced by the model structure, scale,
and implementation techniques. However, in forecasting
approaches, the model has to be calibrated by using sta-
tistical estimates based on the analysis of epidemic out-
break data for as many key parameters as possible, and
possibly by matching less crucial parameters with pub-
lished historical data. One major technical problem for
real-time forecasting is that some parameters, such as
the basic reproduction number, are not absolute quanti-
ties, and are very dependent on the choice of the model
and model parameterization. Two models with different
assumptions may reproduce an epidemic profile equally
well by using slightly different values of the basic repro-
duction number, because of the different modeling
assumptions used [25]. Thus, within each modeling fra-
mework, it is important to have techniques for para-
meter estimation that are self-consistent with the model
assumptions, and cannot be generally imported from
other studies. In data-driven MCMs, the self-consistent
calibration of the model represents a real challenge
because of the number of estimated parameters and the
computational costs needed in the case of stochastic
individual-based models. Finally, another major problem
hindering the advance of real-time forecasting with
MCMs is model validation. Real-time forecasting has to
be validated using datasets that are independent from
those used for the model calibration. Only a few events
in recent times have offered the possibility of a poster-
iori validation of the real-time forecasting of MCMs,
using rich and high-quality datasets [26].
The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic indicated an
important role for MCMs in the real-time analysis of
disease dynamics and propagation [2,27-39]. Given the
uncertainty associated with the emergence of a new
virus, such models allowed estimation of unknown epi-
demiological parameters, description of the observed
epidemic propagation, interpretation of surveillance
data, exploration of possible scenarios, estimation of the
efficacy of intervention measures, and predictions of
future influenza activity. The data gathered during the
course of the pandemic can now be used to compare
with the estimates calculated by the models, and thus
these represent an unprecedented opportunity to validate
and assess the results obtained by MCM approaches.
In this study, we assessed results obtained using the
Global Epidemic and Mobility (GLEAM) computational
model [2,3]. This model integrates high-resolution data
on human demography and mobility on a worldwide
scale in a metapopulation stochastic epidemic frame-
work. With the emergence of the novel H1N1 virus in
2009, the model offered the opportunity to study the
spread of the pandemic in real time, and thus evaluate
specific public-health actions and provide stochastic
forecasts of its future unfolding. The basic model para-
meters (transmissibility and seasonality) were obtained
with a Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood (MCML)-
based approach using the chronological data on the
pandemic invasion up to 18 June 2009 [2]. This proce-
dure, although extremely costly in terms of computa-
tional time (more than 106 simulations were generated),
can be performed in real time using a supercomputer.
The obtained estimates were used to generate a large
number of nominally identically initialized numerical
stochastic simulations of the global progression of the
H1N1 pandemic after 18 June 2009. The simulations
provide, for each point in space and time allowed by the
resolution of the model, the set of possible epidemic
evolution by statistically defining the median, mean, and
reference range of a number of epidemic parameters,
including newly generated cases, seeding events, and
time of arrival of the infection. For the model, we used
3,362 subpopulations in 220 countries worldwide, with a
geographical resolution of 15 × 15 minutes of arc, and
the time scale of a single day. Based on the early data of
the H1N1 pandemic up to June 2009, the model allowed
the stochastic forecasting of the activity peak of the fall/
winter wave in the northern hemisphere, along with
other quantities of interest. The forecasts were pub-
lished in September 2009 [2], well before the peak
weeks of epidemic activity in the northern hemisphere.
The aim of this study was to validate the model’s pre-
dictions by comparing them with real-life data collected
from surveillance and virologic sources in 48 countries
in the northern hemisphere during the course of the
pandemic. These data allowed independent validation of
the obtained results and also allowed the accuracy of
the model to be tested. Specifically, we considered the
validity of the predicted peak time of the fall wave in
the northern hemisphere, the clinical attack rate, and
the effectiveness of vaccination. Furthermore, we ana-
lyzed results at a finer spatial resolution to ascertain the
validity of the model on scales smaller than country
level. Using the surveillance data, the timing of the pan-
demic activity peak was found to fall within the predic-
tion interval for 87% of the countries. In the 13% of the
cases falling outside the 95% reference range, the offset
Tizzoni et al. BMC Medicine 2012, 10:165
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/10/165
Page 2 of 31
with respect to the confidence interval was, at most,
2 weeks at the country level. Because the activity peak in
each country is defined as an average over regions com-
posed of many different subpopulations, where data were
available we have provided the analysis broken down into
smaller surveillance regions, obtaining very good agree-
ment between the model results and data. We also inte-
grated into the model all available data on the vaccination
campaigns in 27 countries, and compared the predicted
incidence intervals with official estimates such as those
produced by the Center for Disease Control and Preven-
tion in the USA. In addition, we analyzed the effect of
introducing into the model predictions a number of addi-
tional factors that were only known at the end of the pan-
demic, such as pre-existing immunity, and found that the
epidemic timing results were sufficiently robust to cope
with changes in these parameters.
Finally, we explored the robustness of the stochastic
forecast as a function of the completeness of the data
integrated into the model. In particular, one subject of
debate has been the level of detail about the international
aviation transportation network that would be required
to reliably simulate the spreading of infectious diseases
worldwide. Whereas the GLEAM model used the full
international aviation database, many previous studies
have focused only on partial datasets that comprise the
top 30% or less of the full dataset [4,6,9,14,29,40,41]. We
show that working with partial datasets considerably
reduces the accuracy of the predictions at both the local
and the global level.
This study shows that although supercomputing cap-
abilities are required, data-driven MCM allows real-time
forecasting of emerging influenza-like illnesses (ILIs)
with an accuracy that can provide valuable information
to inform public-health decision-making. The GLEAM
computational tool also allows the introduction of further
details in the population structure, such as age classes,
and it has been aligned with an agent-based model [42],
thus providing avenues for the development of hybrid
computational approaches that are able to use different
levels of data integration in different subpopulations,
with an appropriate compromise between computational
requirements and resolution scale of the results.
Methods
Model
We used a data-driven global stochastic epidemic model,
which is based on the metapopulation approach [4-6,
9,14,22,43-48]. The model has been extensively described
previously, and all the technical details and the algorithms
underpinning the model results reported [2,3,49]. By inte-
grating real demographic and mobility data, the model
divides the world population into geographic census areas
that are defined around transportation hubs and connected
by mobility fluxes, which then defines a subpopulation net-
work. Within each subpopulation, a compartmental struc-
ture models the disease spread between individuals.
Individuals can move from one subpopulation to another
along the mobility network; in this way, an outbreak origi-
nating in a seed subpopulation can lead to a global-scale
epidemic. The GLEAM model can simulate the global
spread of ILIs, and also allows study of the implementation
of a wide range of intervention strategies, including vacci-
nations, antiviral treatment, and travel restrictions (which
can be temporally and geographically dependent), to model
the different measures adopted by countries in response to
an ongoing pandemic. The GLEAM model architecture
integrates three different data layers: 1) the population
layer, 2) the transportation mobility layer, and 3) the epi-
demic layer.
The population layer is based on the high-resolution
population database of the ‘Gridded Population of the
World’ project of the Socioeconomic Data and Application
Center at Columbia University (SEDAC) [50]. This data-
base provides a population estimate by using a grid of cells
covering the whole planet, with a resolution of 15 × 15
minutes of arc. The subpopulations of the metapopulation
structure correspond to geographic census areas defined
around transportation hubs, which are represented by the
world airports, as provided by international databases of
air travel. The census areas are obtained using a Voronoi-
like tessellation of the Earth’s surface by assigning each
cell of the grid to the closest airport, taking into account
distance constraints [3]. The resulting network of subpo-
pulations counts 3,362 census areas in 220 different
countries.
The mobility layer takes into account the multiscale
nature of human mobility. The GLEAM model integrates
the mobility by global air travel (obtained from the Inter-
national Air Transport Association [51] and Official
Airline Guide [52] databases) and the short-scale mobility
between adjacent subpopulations, which represents the
daily commuting patterns of individuals. We obtained
the commuting fluxes by collecting and integrating the
data of 30 countries in 5 continents across the world [3]
(see Additional file 1A). The model simulates the number
of passengers traveling daily worldwide by using the real
data obtained from the airline transportation databases,
which contain the number of available seats on each air-
line connection in the world. The commuting short-
range couplings between subpopulations are accounted
for by defining the effective force of infections in subpo-
pulations connected by commuting flows [3,53,54].
The epidemic model within each subpopulation con-
siders a compartmental approach specific for the disease
under study [55]. In the present application to the H1N1
pandemic, we assumed that each individual can be in one
of the following discrete states: susceptible, latent,
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symptomatic infectious able to travel, symptomatic infec-
tious unable to travel, asymptomatic infectious, and perma-
nently recovered [2]. The model assumes homogeneous
mixing within each subpopulation. The disease transmis-
sion rate of symptomatic infectious individuals is b, and it
is assumed to be rescaled by a factor rb = 50% for asympto-
matic individuals [24,27]. After the infection, susceptible
individuals enter the latent compartment, where they are
infected but not yet contagious. After the latency period,
assumed to be equal to the incubation period and of aver-
age duration ε-1, exposed individuals become infectious
and have a probability (1-pa) of developing clinical symp-
toms, with pa considered to be the probability of becoming
asymptomatic equal to 33% [56]. Change in traveling beha-
vior after the onset of symptoms is modeled by setting to
50% the probability 1-pt that individuals would not travel
when ill [24]. Eventually, infected individuals recover after
the average infectious period μ-1, and they are no longer
susceptible. Figure 1 shows the natural history of influenza
simulated using the H1N1 GLEAM model. All the stochas-
tic processes modeling the transitions of individuals in the
different compartments and their mobility are mathemati-
cally defined by discrete stochastic chain binomial and
multinomial processes [57,58] to preserve the discrete and
stochastic nature of the processes. Individuals are discrete
but indistinguishable, because no additional population
structure (for example, households or workplaces) is being
considered.
The spreading rate of the disease at the level of a single
subpopulation is governed by the basic reproduction num-
ber, R0, which is a function of the parameters defining the
natural history of the disease [53]. In our study, the basic
reproduction number can be expressed as:
R0 =
β
µ
[
rβpa +
(
1 − pa
)]
.
However, in a metapopulation framework in which
space is explicitly considered, the reproductive number
is dependent on space and time, and it is more appro-
priate to define an effective reproduction number R(t).
In more detail, to take into account seasonal effects in
the transmission of influenza, we considered a seasonal
forcing of the reproduction number, dependent on the
calendar time and the region considered. We assumed
the world is divided into three regions, delimited by the
two Tropics: the northern hemisphere, the southern
hemisphere, and the tropical region. We denoted by R0
the reference value of the reproduction number in the
Tropics that needed to be estimated from empirical data
of the epidemic. The model reproduces seasonality by
means of a sinusoidal rescaling of R0, by a factor ranging
from amin (during the summer season) to amax (during
the winter season) [9].
The rescaling function has the form:
α (t) =
1
2
[
(αmax − αmin) sin
(
2π
365
(t − tmax) +
π
2
)
+ αmax + αmin
]
,
where the time of year for the minimum and maximum
is fixed and is based on historical data and previous mod-
els set at 15 July and 15 January, in opposition in the
northern and southern hemispheres. Values of amin are
typically very small for seasonal influenza, so that during
Figure 1 Natural history of influenza. After acquiring the infection, a susceptible individual enters the latent compartment, where he is
infected but not yet infectious. After the average latency period, each infected individual becomes infectious, and may or may not show
symptoms. Symptomatic cases are more infectious than asymptomatic cases. Finally, all infected individuals recover after the average infectious
period and become immune to the disease.
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the summer season, the effective reproduction number is
rescaled to values of less than 1, which are below the
threshold for transmission. We set amax to 1.1, corre-
sponding to a mild increase in disease transmissibility
during winter compared with the reference value. Thus,
amin is one of the key parameters to be calibrated from
the empirical data of the initial invasion of H1N1 pan-
demic in order to assess the seasonal variation of the
transmissibility of the pandemic virus (see the subsection
entitled ‘Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood parameter
estimate’).
Computational implementation
The GLEAM model is implemented in C/C++. A detailed
description of the algorithmic structure of GLEAM has
been reported previously [49]. Briefly, GLEAM is imple-
mented in a modular manner, with each module per-
forming a specific function. The compartmental model
and the epidemic parameters are defined in a configura-
tion text file that is loaded when the program starts.
Subsequently, the program loads three data input files:
the population database, the short-range mobility net-
work, and the long-range mobility network. During each
time step, which represents a full day, the following mod-
ules are called into the sequence: air travel, the compart-
mental transitions (where the force of infection takes into
account both the infection dynamics and the short-range
movement of individuals), and the partial aggregation of
the results at the desired level of geographic resolution.
After the last time step, the program generates the final
output, which can be further processed for analysis.
A schematic representation is provided in Figure 2.
The average running time depends on the number of
simulated stochastic realizations of the model and the
number of transitions between the epidemic compart-
ments to be modeled. In a cluster with 20 central pro-
cessing units (Xeon 2 Ghz; Intel Corp., Santa Clara, CA,
USA), simulating 2,000 realizations of the model with
365 time steps takes between 3 and 5 hours, depending
on the complexity of the compartmentalization and the
simulated interventions. Simulating one full pandemic
scenario, corresponding to 2,000 realizations for three
different seasonality values, on the same cluster took an
average of 12 hours.
In July 2010, we released the GLEAMviz Simulator, a
software system based on GLEAM, which is publicly avail-
able [59], and is based on a client-server system. The
GLEAMviz client provides access to all the basic GLEAM
features through an interactive graphical user interface.
The user can configure freely the compartmental model
and simulation scenario by setting compartment-specific
variables, transitions, and initial conditions. The user’s set-
tings are sent to the GLEAMviz server, which performs
the simulations and sends back the analyzed results to the
user’s client application. Finally, the user can export the
results or visualize them in terms of dynamic maps and
charts. A full description of the software has been reported
previously [60].
Figure 2 Schematic illustration of the model flowchart. The Global Epidemic and Mobility (GLEAM) computational model is based on a data-
driven approach. The left column represents the three input databases; the center column represents the dynamic processes that are modeled
at each time step, along with their determinants; and the right column indicates example quantities for the model output. Each box is color-
coded according to the corresponding dynamic process.
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Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood parameter estimate
In a forecasting approach, the parameters of the model are
determined from early data about the epidemic outbreak.
Given the number of parameters that a realistic ILI model
contains, a full calibration using early data is made difficult
by the lack of timely data on the number of cases, the tem-
poral description of the disease in hosts (for example,
incubation period, infectious period), the presence of
asymptomatic infections, and the rate of transmissibility of
these asymptomatic infections. However, for this study, it
was possible to distinguish between two classes of para-
meters. The first class refers to key parameters, such as
the specific transmissibility of the disease, which can be
determined from the data. The second class refers to para-
meters that, from sensitivity analysis, have been found to
be less crucial in defining the spatiotemporal pattern of
the disease propagation and for which plausible and rela-
tively stable values can generally be found in the literature.
In the analysis of the H1N1pdm virus, we therefore con-
sidered the virus transmissibility and the amplitude of the
seasonal rescaling (not its timing) to be the key parameters
to estimate. All the other parameters were set to the values
reported in the literature for influenza infections (for
example, asymptomatic rate and relative infectiousness
[24,56], and vaccine and antiviral efficacies [12,61]), or to
those available from the analysis of the early outbreak of
the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic [28,29]. Table 1 provides a
detailed summary of the parameters used in the model,
together with the sensitivity analysis that was performed
previously [2] and the additional exploration provided in
the present study. In particular, we explored variations in
the probability pa of an individual being asymptomatic
(following the evidence provided by a few studies that
showed a less frequent occurrence of symptomatic infec-
tions than that seen for seasonal influenza strains [62,63]),
and of the minimum and maximum scaling factors, amin
and amax, of the transmissibility during the summer and
winter months.
For the set of key parameters, we used a two-step pro-
cess that first estimated the reproductive number R0 in the
Tropics region, where seasonality is assumed not to occur,
and then estimated the degree of seasonal damping factor
by examining a longer time period for international spread
to allow for seasonal variations. As reported previously [2],
estimation of the reference value of the reproduction
number was performed using an MCML technique based
on the early chronology of the H1N1 epidemic. We began
the model with initial conditions set near La Gloria (in the
state of Veracruz, Mexico) on 18 February 2009, as
detailed previously [3,27] and according to official Mexi-
can sources [64]. The arrival time of infected individuals
in the countries seeded by Mexico is clearly a combination
of the number of cases present in the originating country
(Mexico) and the mobility network, both within Mexico
and connecting Mexico with other countries. By relying
on the explicit modeling of the travel behavior of indivi-
duals based on the real data, it was possible to shift the
estimation of R0 from the incidence data in the seed coun-
try to the timing of the early invasion pattern, with the
aim of reducing the errors induced by possible underesti-
mation of cases by surveillance sources. Indeed, the num-
ber of cases reported by the surveillance systems was
found to be dramatically underestimated, as a result of
underdetection and different sampling techniques, as well
as changes in surveillance requirements and capacities
over time [27,31,65,66]. For this reason, we opted to use as
the calibration dataset the first reported case in countries
not yet reached by the epidemic. A similar approach was
used by Fraser et al. [27], and a full sensitivity analysis on
the accuracy of this data for the GLEAM model was per-
formed by Balcan et al. [2]. Furthermore, the data on the
first case were not limited to the arrival date of the person,
Table 1 Epidemiological parameters.1
Parameter Description Value2 Sensitivity analysis range
R0 Reference reproduction number in the Tropics
amin Minimal seasonality rescaling
Gt Generation time, days
3 3.6 (2.2 to 5.1)
μ
-1 Mean infectious period, days3 2.5 (1.1 to 4.0)
ε
-1 Average latency period, days 1.1 days 1.1 to 2.5
rb Relative infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals 0.5 0.1 to 0.8
pa Probability of becoming an asymptomatic individual 0.33 0.33 and 0.5
pt Probability of traveling of a symptomatic individual 0.5 0.4 to 0.6
b Transmission rate μ-1R0/(1-pa-rbpt) As calculated from the reference range of R0
amax Maximal seasonality rescaling 1.1 1.0 and 1.1
1Estimates from the Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood analysis for various values of the parameter space explored.
2The estimated values of R0 and amin for all the stochastic forecast outputs are reported in Table 3.
3The Gt, μ
-1 intervals were set in the MCML analysis and defined by the range of plausible constrained values sampled in the Monte Carlo approach that satisfied
a likelihood ratio test at the 5% level (see text).
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but usually included additional information about the date
of the onset of symptoms, the travel history of the indivi-
dual, and the supposed source of infection [2].
The MCML analysis is schematically depicted in Figure 3.
Being fully stochastic, GLEAM allows for the simulation of
a statistical ensemble of epidemic evolutions approximating
the probability distribution, associated with an observable
statistic that is conditional on the parameters defined as
model input. We chose the set of arrival times ({ti}) for
all the countries, i, as the statistical observable, and the
infection parameters ({p}) as the (unknown) input para-
meters. We then used the simulations to sample the condi-
tional probability distribution in a wide and realistic range
of the parameter space. When evaluated in correspondence
to the point defined by the empirical dataset ({ti*}), this
probability defines the likelihood function: L({p}) = P({ti*}
| ({p}). The simulated arrival times ({ti}) are in principle sta-
tistically dependent variables. Then, to avoid inconvenient
correlations in the computation of L({p}) as a result of mul-
tiple possible transmission routes corresponding to the
same seeding event, we restricted our analysis to the arrival
times of the disease in those countries (n = 12), that were
seeded directly by the source (see Additional file 1B). Thus,
we used a set of arrival times that were conditionally inde-
pendent random variables, leading to a factorized expres-
sion for the likelihood function. We evaluated the
likelihood function by exploring the parameter space using
Monte Carlo sampling, and obtained the best estimate for
the disease parameters by maximizing the likelihood func-
tion in the parameter space. The analysis of the phase
space of both transmissibility and generation interval needs
particularly intensive computational power. For this reason,
we defined the range of acceptable values of the generation
interval as those defined by a maximum likelihood test for
the ratio of the maximum unconstrained likelihood we
could find with the constrained maximum likelihood set at
a fixed infectious period. Thus, we excluded values for the
infectious period that fell outside the 5% level of the likeli-
hood ratio test. Because of noise and the finite exploration
capabilities of the parameter space, all values in the interval
of the infectious period within the 5% level were considered
as equally possible, and we considered the mean interval
value as the reference parameter.
Full calibration of the transmission scenario of the
model requires an estimate of the seasonality factor
(amin) to assess the degree of seasonality of the pandemic
virus. As previously described for the reproduction num-
ber, we based our estimation on the infection arrival
times. We used a larger dataset of 93 countries seeded
before 18 June, regardless of the origin of the first case,
to explore the evolution of the pandemic on a longer
time span, over which seasonality effects could be appre-
ciable. Finally, we analyzed the correlation between the
empirically observed arrival times and those provided by
the model’s simulations, by exploring the possible values
of amin. Importantly, we did not fit or calibrate the timing
of the seasonal forcing.
Each calibration of the model is computationally
expensive, as millions of stochastic simulations are
needed to generate the appropriate ensemble describing
Figure 3 Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood (MCML) method used to estimate the transmission potential of the A/H1N1 pandemic. (A)
Schematic representation of the invasion dynamics of an emerging infectious disease from the seed subpopulation (red patch) to the
neighboring subpopulations connected by means of mobility. The blue color code refers to the arrival time of the first infectious individual. Links
of different width represent mobility connections characterized by different mobility flows. (B) Flow chart representing the steps that compose
the Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood (MCML) method. First, for each point in the parameter space, we ran 2,000 stochastic realizations, all with
the same initial conditions. Second, for each run, we recorded the arrival times in the countries under study. Third, we compared the probability
distribution built on the simulated arrival times with the empirically observed arrival times for each country. Finally, we evaluated the likelihood
function to find its maximum value, corresponding to the set of parameters that best fits the data.
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the spatiotemporal statistical properties that define the
likelihood function. Thus, real-time calibrations require
supercomputing resources, which in June 2009 were pro-
vided to us by the Big Red supercomputer facility [67].
The calibration must be repeated if any new information
on the disease is introduced or if specific data that are
not initially available will affect the initial conditions or
the early phase of the outbreak. Furthermore, each cali-
bration produces different stochastic forecast outputs, as
described in the Results section.
Modeling pandemic management
The GLEAM model allows the implementation of differ-
ent intervention strategies, including pharmaceutical
measures (such as vaccinations and the use of antiviral
drugs), and non-pharmaceutical measures (such as travel
restrictions and social distancing).
Mass vaccination aims at reducing 1) the susceptibility
to infection; 2) the infectiousness if infection occurs; and
3) the probability of developing clinical symptoms [12].
The efficacy of the vaccine with respect to these effects is
quantified by the parameters VES, VEI, and VED, respec-
tively. We incorporated additional compartments in the
disease structure to model mass vaccination [68] (see
Additional file 1C), and, based on preliminary studies
indicating a similar efficacy to that for the vaccine against
seasonal influenza A(H1N1), we referred to previous esti-
mates available in the literature for vaccine efficacy [12],
which are similar to those adopted to provide predictions
for the H1N1 pandemic [28]. We assumed that a suscep-
tible individual, after vaccination, has a reduced probabil-
ity of becoming infected by a factor VES = 70%. Then, if
infection occurs, his infectiousness is reduced by VEI =
30%, while the probability of becoming symptomatic is
reduced by VED = 50%. A sensitivity analysis of these
values and of the vaccination scheme of the model has
been reported previously [68]. The efficacy of vaccines is
not instantaneous, and thus we assumed that a single
dose of vaccine would be administered, providing protec-
tion after a delay of 2 weeks, based on available data from
adult clinical studies on the H1N1 influenza vaccine [69].
Given that GLEAM does not consider any additional
social or age structure of the population within each geo-
graphical census area, the prioritized distribution of vac-
cines to risk groups cannot be implemented in the
model, thus we assumed uniform distribution of the
vaccines to a given fraction of the population.
Vaccination is considered in the model in two ways: as a
dynamic process simulating the response of countries to
the ongoing pandemic based on available data, or as a pre-
vaccination scenario. The latter assumes that a fraction of
the population of each country (corresponding to 20%,
30%, or 50% of the total) was already vaccinated before the
outbreak started in Mexico, that is, at time t = 0 of the
simulation, simulating a possible universal pre-vaccination
to a given fraction of the population before the spread
occurs in that region [28], the availability of a pre-prepared
vaccine [12,21-23], or a possible degree of pre-existing
immunity in the population. The reactive situation, in
which countries implement the vaccination campaign after
the vaccine has become available, is based on empirical
data of the start and end dates of the vaccination cam-
paign, and of the total coverage of the population vacci-
nated, based on reports provided by national agencies.
During the summer of 2009, several countries in the
northern hemisphere scheduled vaccination campaigns to
mitigate the incoming pandemic winter wave. The simula-
tions reproduced the vaccination campaigns put into
action during fall/winter 2009, taking into account the dif-
ferences between countries in the deployment of vaccines,
given the availability of vaccines, and the starting dates for
the vaccine stockpile availability. We also assumed that
once the national campaign started in a given country,
susceptible individuals would be vaccinated daily at a con-
stant rate, calculated on the basis of the campaign’s dura-
tion, until the desired final coverage is reached. Daily
administration rates per country varied from 0.01% to
1.1%, and were explicitly implemented in the model differ-
ently from scenario-like approaches, for which this value
is generally assumed to be equal to 0.5% [13] or 1%
[12,28,29]. Data on observed vaccination campaigns at the
country level are presented in Table 2, and the corre-
sponding sources are reported in Additional file 1E.
Although the treatment of clinical cases with antiviral
drugs (neuraminidase inhibitors) aimed at reducing the
severity of the disease and the transmissibility while infec-
tious [5,11,13,21-23,70-72], were not implemented system-
atically during the A/H1N1 pandemic, we considered this
possibility in the model in order to investigate any possible
modifications to the overall spatiotemporal pattern of the
pandemic. In particular, we studied a scenario assuming
the prompt detection of symptomatic cases and the rapid
administration of the drug to 30% of the clinical cases who
would be treated within the first day from the onset of
symptoms [2,5]. Moreover, we assumed the efficacy of the
drug in reducing transmission to be equal to 62%, and a
reduction of 1 day in the total infectious period, as avail-
able from the existing literature [22,23], although the evi-
dence of the efficacy of neuraminidase inhibitors in
relation to transmission is still under debate [73]. To guar-
antee a realistic description of the antiviral distribution, we
modeled the drug availability in each country by using
actual data, collected from the study of Singer et al. [74]
and from national agencies. Thus, treatment with antiviral
drugs was simulated only for those countries that had
drug stockpiles available at the beginning of the pandemic.
The intervention at the national level was assumed to start
with a delay of 3 days after the appearance of the first
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symptomatic individual in the country, but not before the
international pandemic alert released on 25 April. Admin-
istration of the drugs was assumed to occur at a constant
rate until depletion of the country’s stockpile. Figure S1
(see Additional file 1C) displays the compartmental struc-
ture in each subpopulation when pharmaceutical measures
were considered.
In addition to pharmaceutical measures, we also consid-
ered interventions aimed at limiting the mobility of indivi-
duals and applied in terms of travel restrictions. The
explicit inclusion of the mobility network in the GLEAM
model allowed us to apply modifications to individual
mobility by air in a variety of forms to take into account
real-life behaviors. More specifically, interruption of speci-
fic travel routes or airports for an arbitrary period can be
considered in the model, and the traffic flows to and from
given locations (for example, the outbreak seed) can be
reduced and modulated in time, based on real data. Some
countries did in fact adopt travel-related measures in an
attempt to contain or slow down the international spread
of the A/H1N1 virus. In a few extreme cases, the authori-
ties banned all the flights directed to/from Mexico, in
order to prevent infected individuals from crossing inter-
national borders. These measures, along with self-imposed
travel limitations, contributed to a decline of about 40% in
international air traffic to and from Mexico after the inter-
national alert, which was slowly reduced after June 2009
and had returned back to normal in about 3 months (see
references [75,76] for analysis of the data). Thus, simula-
tions with travel-related measures considered the variation
over time of the reduction of traffic flows to and from
Mexico, as observed in the data.
Table 2 Mass vaccination campaigns in the northern hemisphere.1,2
Country Mass vaccination starting date Final vaccine uptake, % Daily administration rate, %3
China September 14, 2009 6 0.04
Hungary October 1, 2009 30 0.24
United States October 5, 2009 27 0.2
Canada October 12, 2009 45 0.4
Italy October 12, 2009 1.5 0.01
Japan October 19, 2009 17 0.15
Israel October 19, 2009 9 0.03
France October 20, 2009 9 0.08
Sweden October 21, 2009 60 0.35
UK October 26, 2009 8 0.05
Germany October 26, 2009 8 0.1
Portugal October 26, 2009 3 0.04
Finland October 26, 2009 50 0.4
Austria October 26, 2009 3.3 0.03
Ireland October 31, 2009 17 0.1
Denmark November 2, 2009 6 0.07
Turkey November 2, 2009 3 0.02
Iceland November 2, 2009 40 0.35
Belgium November 2, 2009 7.5 0.07
Slovenia November 2, 2009 5 0.05
Netherlands November 9, 2009 25 1.1
Switzerland November 15, 2009 15 0.2
Spain November 16, 2009 4.5 0.05
Greece November 16, 2009 3 0.05
Tunisia November 16, 2009 2.6 0.05
Czech Republic November 23, 2009 0.6 0.01
Norway December 1, 2009 45 0.3
1Data on the timing and final population coverage of mass vaccination campaigns in the countries of the northern hemisphere, during the 2009 to 2010 winter
season.
2Sources of the data are reported in Additional file 1, Table S4.
3The daily administration rate per country was calculated by assuming a constant rate during the vaccination period indicated by the data up to the final uptake
value reached in each country.
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Finally, control strategies implemented at the level of
social groups of single individuals, such as social distan-
cing measures or school closure, can be introduced into
the model only by an effective rescaling of the reproduc-
tion number for a given time period and in a specific
geographic region. Applying this approach, we simulated
the interventions that took place in Mexico starting on
24 April and ending on 10 May, using a time-dependent
modification of the reproductive number in the country
as reported previously [77]. During the period when
social distancing was effective in Mexico, we assumed
that the reproductive number in Mexico, RMex, changed
its value to RMex = 0.9, resulting in about a 50% reduc-
tion from the reference value. Different reduction rates
of RMex have been tested previously [2], and no signifi-
cant changes were found.
Modeling population immunity profile
Taking into account the recent results of serological
analyses [78-81], we also considered simulations in
which the population had an initial degree of immunity
before exposure, and assessed the change in the predic-
tions provided by the model when full susceptibility in
the population is taken into account. Measurements of
antibodies in serum samples can be used to identify
cross-reactivity between antibodies elicited by seasonal
influenza viruses circulating before the pandemic, thus
providing estimates of pre-exposure immunity to the
H1N1 pandemic virus in the population [17,82]. Serolo-
gical surveys reported evidence of substantial pre-expo-
sure immunity to the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic virus
among older sections of the population. The detected
levels of pre-exposure cross-reactive antibodies ranged
from 23% of individuals aged 65 years or over in the UK
[78], to 30% and 34% for those born before 1950 (that
is, those aged 60 years or over in 2009) in Finland [79]
and the USA [80], respectively, and 37% in Germany for
the same age group [81]. To explore the effects of pre-
exposure immunity, we assumed that 33% of individuals
older than 60 years would be immune and completely
protected against the H1N1 pandemic virus. We used
the data from the International Database of the US Cen-
sus Bureau [83] to estimate the corresponding fraction
of each country’s total population with pre-exposure
immunity, relying on the different national age profiles,
given that in this work we did not consider age struc-
ture in the GLEAM modeling of the population.
Surveillance data
To compare our numerical results with the observed tem-
poral and geographic pattern of the pandemic fall/winter
wave, we collected data from the monitoring systems of
48 countries in the northern hemisphere, accessing
their official websites on a regular weekly basis, and also
downloading their final reports at the end of the wave
with an assessment of the influenza activity using the most
relevant indicators (for the full list of our data sources, see
Additional file 1E).
Surveillance systems in the countries under study use
different operative methods and a wide range of influenza
case definitions to monitor influenza activity within the
country. Our data sources reported at least one or more
of the following indicators on a weekly basis: ILI inci-
dence, acute respiratory infection (ARI) incidence, frac-
tion of ILI visits or fraction of ILI patients per sentinel
doctor, and number of H1N1pdm laboratory-confirmed
cases. All of the indicators are generally based on the
number of individuals that seek health care and who
have respiratory symptoms that can be specifically diag-
nosed as ILI or, with a broader set of possible causes, as
ARIs. Specific virologic analyses are typically conducted
on a subset of patients to monitor the activity per strain.
Worldwide surveillance networks adopt a large variety of
clinical case definitions, and there is currently no interna-
tional consensus on a ‘gold standard’ for the case defini-
tion of influenza (see, for instance, the UK Health
Protection Agency [84] and the US Centers for Disease
Control [85] definitions for H1N1 cases). Nevertheless,
most surveillance networks share common symptoms or
common generic terms in their definitions [86], and both
the ILI and ARI case definitions were found to be good
indicators of influenza activity in Europe [87]. The har-
monization of influenza monitoring across countries with
a single ILI case definition is currently being tested in
Europe, using online surveillance systems [88].
Depending on the system, indicators may need to be
adjusted to specific normalization factors or consultation
rates to extrapolate numbers of cases with respect to the
whole population. In particular, healthcare-seeking beha-
vior is a parameter that is difficult to estimate. Moreover,
it may vary across age groups and it may also change
over time, especially during a health emergency such as a
pandemic influenza, as a result of government advice,
media coverage, and resulting public anxiety [89]. Given
that we were interested in the fall/winter wave of the
2009 H1N1 pandemic, we assumed a constant surveil-
lance effort and consultation rate across time in the
countries under study (the same assumption would not
be true when comparing the first and the second waves,
as, for example, in the UK [89-91]). In addition, because
surveillance data were used in this work only to provide a
comparison with the timing of our predictions, we disre-
garded normalization factors and consultation rates, and
assumed that surveillance data provided a reliable esti-
mate of the timing of the influenza activity peak using
the various available indicators [87]. Finally, to account
for the uncertainty intrinsic to empirical data, we used a
color gradient to indicate the observed peak weeks, with
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the limits corresponding to the time interval in which an
incidence of greater than 80% of the maximum was
observed.
Results and Discussion
Stochastic forecast output sets
As discussed in the Methods section, the GLEAM model
generates a large number of nominally identically initia-
lized numerical stochastic simulations of an epidemic’s
global progression. The simulations provide, for each
point in space and time as given by the resolution of the
model, an ensemble of possible epidemic evolutions. It
gives median, mean, and reference ranges for epidemic
observables, such as newly generated cases, seeding
events, time of arrival of the infection, and number of
drugs used. The ensemble forecast and the statistical
quantities depend on the key parameters determined by
the MCML calibration of the model. Each calibration
thus defines a different stochastic forecast output (SFO)
set that can be validated against real data.
Each MCML calibration and the corresponding SFO
set corresponded to the numerical generation of more
than 106 global simulations, and the manipulation and
storage of about 1 terabyte of data.
We considered the following SFO sets and their corre-
sponding calibrations:
• Baseline SFO set. This is the set corresponding to the
numerical analysis presented previously [2]. This set was
generated in June 2009, and owing to lack of data, it did
not include change in traveling behavior and/or pre-
exposure immunity. This set was particularly relevant in
the validation process because it is the SFO achieved in
real time before the unfolding of the winter wave of influ-
enza in the northern hemisphere.
• Reference SFO set. This SFO set was obtained by a
calibration that considered the observed drop in travel
flow during the early stage of the outbreak, as reported
by the Mexican authorities [76]. These data became avail-
able in December 2009, and for this reason, could not be
considered in our initial work. The reference SFO was
then coupled with a series of intervention options (out-
side Mexico), considered one at a time (described in the
Methods section), to assess the effect of the following:
travel restrictions of increased magnitude; vaccination
campaigns as deployed in reality (obtained from data
available after the pandemic); and antiviral treatment and
pre-vaccination as hypothetical scenarios. Those inter-
ventions, which were implemented well after the start of
the pandemic, did not affect the model calibration.
• Pre-exposure immunity SFO set. Based on the recent
results of serological analyses [78-81], this set assumed
that a fraction of the total population of each country
would have pre-exposure immunity to the pandemic virus.
This fraction was calculated by relying on the different
national age profiles to match the observed pre-exposure
immunity in individuals older than 60 years (see Methods).
Unlike the other SFO sets, in which interventions starting
at a later stage of the epidemic were considered, the pre-
exposure immunity SFO set requires performance of a full
MCML calibration, given that the initial conditions of the
population’s immunity profile have changed. The pre-
exposure immunity SFO set is also analyzed by including
vaccination campaigns.
A schematic description of the components of each
SFO set and the interventions considered is provided in
Table 3.
Finally, we explored additional SFO sets to perform a
sensitivity analysis of the conditions and assumptions
considered in the simulations, in which we assessed the
role of the following: consideration of a sample of the air-
line transportation network; the winter and summer
rescaling values of the seasonal sinusoidal function (amax
and amin, respectively); the parameters related to asymp-
tomatic infections; and the initial geographic conditions
of the seed outbreak location in Mexico. In all of these
cases, a new estimate of the seasonal transmission sce-
nario was performed because the initial conditions had
changed. All of the SFO sets explored the evolution of
the pandemic over a time span of 1 year, and the results
shown in the following sections were obtained from at
least 2,000 stochastic simulations.
We report in Table 3 the values of the parameters
obtained by the MCML estimate for each of the SFO sets.
Generally, the parameter values were not particularly sen-
sitive to the progressive integration of data on reduction
of travel to and from Mexico. A rationale for this result is
provided in the next section. The values obtained in the
different MCML estimates for R0 ranged from 1.64 to
1.91. It should be noted that this number refers to the
reference value, and the effective reproduction number is
determined at each time step of the simulation by consid-
ering the seasonal effects. This seasonal scaling provides
an effective reproduction number in the northern hemi-
sphere, ranging from 1.05 to 1.5 in the spring/summer
months, in agreement with published estimates of the
reproduction number [27,28]. The time dependence of the
seasonally effective reproduction number R(t) in the
northern and southern hemispheres, for the estimated
values of R0 and amin in the A/H1N1 pandemic baseline
SFO set, was calculated (see Additional file 1D, Figure S2).
Early stage, first-case importations, and travel restrictions
In the early stage of the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic, the
worldwide air-transportation network was the main dis-
semination mechanism from Mexico to the rest of the
world. We first assessed the role of the observed travel
decline on the MCML estimates and the SFO set for the
early stage of the epidemic by using the data on travel
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to and from Mexico that became available at the end of
2009. We compared the results of the baseline SFO with
those of the reference SFO in which the observed travel
decline was considered. The discrete stochastic structure
of the model allowed tracking of the arrival of each
detectable (that is, symptomatic) and non-detectable
(that is, latent or asymptomatic) infected individual in
any given country. By defining the arrival time as the
date on which the first symptomatic case arrived in a
given country, it was possible to quantify the delay in
the spreading of the epidemic from country to country
that was achieved by traffic reduction. The decline of
40% in the travel flows to and from Mexico reported for
the month of May 2009 (which was then followed by
lowered reductions until a return to normality 3 months
later) led to an average delay in the importation of the
first case in seeded countries of less than 3 days [69],
without altering the MCML estimate of the seasonal
transmission. This is consistent with the results we pre-
viously obtained in a sensitivity analysis investigating the
robustness of the estimation procedure to variations in
the chronological data of the first imported case, assum-
ing possible inaccuracies in the reporting [2].
Furthermore, the numerical simulations allowed us to
test whether a decrease in travel flows of magnitudes lar-
ger than the observed 40% would have provided any
additional benefit in slowing down the propagation of the
A/H1N1 virus across the world. We considered reduc-
tions ranging from 50% to 90% in the air travel flows
connecting Mexico with the rest of the world, starting on
25 April, after the international alert, and optimistically
assumed prompt implementation of the intervention by
the authorities, with no further delays. We also assumed
that the reduction would be kept constant across time
and would never reduce nor return to normality, which
is different from the situation revealed by the real data.
Instead of measuring the average delay only, we con-
sidered for every country the probability distribution of
the arrival time of the first symptomatic infectious indi-
vidual, with no regard to the source of infection, which
allowed us to take into account the stochasticity of
these events in order to explore how the probability dis-
tributions would change for increasing travel reductions.
Germany is an example where, based on our simula-
tions, the arrival time probability distribution would
have peaked a few days later than the real arrival date
(Figure 4A). However, travel reductions of a magnitude
equal to 60% or 90% would not be able to delay the dis-
tribution peak time, and would result only in a change
in the tail of the distribution; a more rapid drop after
the peak would then be followed by an increase later
on, owing to the arrival of cases from countries other
than Mexico. By focusing only on the seeding from
Mexico, we were able to compute the cumulative distri-
bution of all seeding events, taking into account latent,
symptomatic, and asymptomatic infected individuals.
We found that the cumulative probability distribution of
the seeding could be reduced by travel-related measures,
resulting in a slower importation rate (Figure 4B). By
fixing the cumulative probability at 90%, we computed
the delay induced by the travel reductions for a set
of countries (Figure 4C). Even with an unfeasibly large
traffic drop of 90%, the achieved delay was less than
20 days. This would offer additional time to activate the
Table 3 Summary of the A/H1N1pdm Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood (MCML) calibrations and best parameter
estimates.
MCML and interventions1,2
Baseline SFO Reference SFO Pre-exposure immunity SFO
Social distancing in Mexico, April 24-May 10, 2009 ✓ ✓ ✓
Traffic reduction after April 25, 2009 ✓ ✓
Pre-exposure immunity ✓
Vaccinations campaigns (data-driven) + +
Antiviral treatment (hypothetical scenario) +
Pre-vaccination (hypothetical scenario) +
MCML estimates3
Minimal seasonal rescaling factor, amin
4 0.65
(0.60 - 0.70)
0.65
(0.60 - 0.70)
0.70
(0.65 - 0.75)
Reference reproduction number in the Tropics, R0
5 1.75 (1.64 - 1.88) 1.75 (1.64 - 1.88) 1.8 (1.69 - 1.91)
1The ‘✓’ symbol indicates the components considered in each stochastic forecast output (SFO) set and hence also in the calibration.
2The + symbol indicates the data-driven interventions and/or hypothetical scenarios considered in addition to each SFO set.
3Each MCML calibration and the corresponding set of best estimates was used to generate the stochastic forecast output datasets consisting of an ensemble of
possible epidemic evolutions defining a median, mean, and reference range for epidemic observables.
4The amin interval is the best-fit range within the minimal resolution allowed by the Monte Carlo sampling.
5For R0, we report the 95% confidence interval (in square brackets).
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pandemic preparedness plans of each country to control
the initial local transmission of a novel strain, such as
by enhancing surveillance, but it would provide little or
no benefit in gaining time for vaccination interventions,
given that the scale of vaccine development, production,
and distribution is about 6 months.
Confirming previous modeling and theoretical works on
travel restrictions in pandemic planning [5,9,12-14,20,92]
and empirical studies on entry screening [93], these results
suggest that the observed travel drop did not lead to sub-
stantial delays in the arrival of the H1N1 epidemic to non-
affected areas. In addition, the simulations showed that it
would not be possible to contain the pandemic by the sole
implementation of travel restrictions, even if these were
unfeasibly strict. These results can be rationalized in a the-
oretical framework characterizing the invasion dynamics
of the epidemics at the metapopulation level, and are
related to the heterogeneity of the mobility patterns of
humans [76,94].
Pandemic activity peaks in the northern hemisphere
The influenza activity data collected from 48 countries in
the northern hemisphere (some of which lie across the
northern hemisphere and the Tropics region) showed that
most of the countries experienced a single major influenza
wave during the fall of 2009. Data from virus specimens
collected worldwide indicated that the wave was mainly
due to the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic strain, which was the
predominant strain in the 2009 to 2010 season, accounting
for more than 90% of the sampled specimens [95]. The
influenza activity in these countries peaked during the per-
iod October to December, much earlier than the usual
timing of seasonal influenza for countries in the northern
hemisphere, which generally ranges between January and
March. The pandemic peaked first in North America
between the end of September and the end of October (in
Mexico first, then in the USA, and soon after in Canada),
and later in Europe. The situation in Europe was more
heterogeneous, leading to an overall range of timing for
Figure 4 Travel-related measures in the early stage of the epidemic. (A) Probability distribution of the arrival time (date of arrival of the first
symptomatic case) in Germany for different values of traffic reduction, j. The vertical dotted line indicates the observed arrival time in the country, as
obtained from official reports, and the vertical solid line indicates the starting date of the travel restrictions (25 April, 2009), which was the day after the
international alert. The probability distributions were obtained from 2,000 stochastic realizations, and data were binned over 7 days. (B) Cumulative
probability distributions of the first seeding event from Mexico to Germany for different values of traffic reduction j. We considered any source of
infection in the seeding event, including symptomatic cases and non-detectable infected cases, such as latent and asymptomatic. (C) Delay in the
case importation from Mexico to a given country compared with the reference stochastic forecast output (SFO) as a function of the travel reduction j.
The delay was measured in terms of the date at which the cumulative distribution of the seeding from Mexico (B) reached 90%.
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the week of peak activity from late October to late Decem-
ber. The peak timing from the surveillance data of the var-
ious countries was subdivided by world regions and
ordered by timing within each region (Figure 5); with few
exceptions, the first peak of activity was experienced by
countries in Western Europe, later followed by Eastern
Europe. Other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and
North Africa were also analyzed, showing peak data in the
months of November and December.
We found that the peak week correlated significantly
with the total air traffic of each individual country to and
from North America, both in the data and in the model
output (Table 4). Similar correlations were found when we
restricted the analysis to European countries, with a corre-
lation between the peak week and the intra-European air
traffic of any individual country, which was captured both
by the data and the model. The peak week was also found
to be positively correlated with a country’s longitude, gen-
erally indicating a west to east pattern, and this correlation
seemed to be stronger in Europe (as reported previously
[39]), both in the data and the model output, probably as a
result of the large air traffic between Western Europe and
North America. A weak correlation was found between
the peak week and the latitude of individual countries,
both at the global level and when restricting the analysis
to European countries.
The empirical data were compared with the results of
the numerical simulations performed for the baseline
SFO set (Figure 5). In light of the results presented in the
previous subsection, we checked whether the timing of
the simulated epidemic activity showed any differences
between the reference SFO set (in which the observed
travel drop during the early stage was incorporated into
the model) and the baseline SFO set (in which that aspect
was not considered because the data were not yet avail-
able), for which predictions were reported previously [2].
We found that 95% of the reference range of the simu-
lated peak week was obtained from the minimal seasonal-
ity rescaling, amin, in the range of 0.6 to 0.7, estimated
from the calibration. The SFO sets therefore seemed to
be in very good agreement with the empirical data, show-
ing that the latter fell within the confidence interval of
numerical results in most of the countries under study.
Only for 13% of the countries did our predictions differ
from the observed timing of the influenza activity, and in
these, the early arrival (France, Switzerland, Hungary) or
Figure 5 Peak timing in the northern hemisphere: simulations and real data. Peak weeks of the epidemic activity in the baseline stochastic
forecast output (SFO) (gray). The reference ranges of the simulated peak week were obtained by analysis of 2,000 stochastic realizations of the
model for three different values of the seasonal rescaling factor, amin, of 0.6, 0.65, and 0.7. The peak weeks reported by the surveillance for the
fall/winter wave are shown as color gradients, whose limits correspond to the time interval at which an incidence of greater than 80% of the
maximum incidence was observed. The numbers 1 to 5 indicate the type of data provided by the surveillance of each country, and the
numbered weeks of the year correspond to the calendar used by the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
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the delay (Ukraine, Mongolia, Uzbekistan) compared
with the simulations was 2 weeks at most, measured
from peak week to the closest end value of the reference
range of the numerical results.
We compared the predicted peak week for the baseline
SFO set with amin = 0.65 against the observed peak week,
and found a range of 4 weeks’ difference (gray shaded area
in Figure 6) between the observed and the predicted peak
week. There was a significant correlation between the data
and the prediction (Spearman correlation coefficient 0.48,
P = 0.0001). The error lay within 4 weeks for 95% of the
countries, and within 2 weeks for 50% of them, and the
median error was 0 (Figure 6). We also compared the
median predicted peak weeks and the observed peak
weeks using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, and found no
significant difference between the two sets, at the 0.01
level of significance (Z score < 2.33).
It should be noted that the obtained results are highly
non-trivial because of the anticipated peak of the pan-
demic in the northern hemisphere. The GLEAM model
does not alter the timing of the seasonal forcing that
would intuitively generate an activity peak in mid-January.
The anticipated peaks are thus a genuine result originating
from the initial condition of the pandemic, the transmissi-
bility estimate, and the spreading pattern generated by the
human mobility integrated into the model. In this sense,
the offset of 1 or 2 weeks observed for a limited number
of countries can still be considered a good result, com-
pared with the several months for dispersion allowed in
principle by the seasonal forcing only.
An offset of 2 or 3 weeks for the forecast may be due
not only to the model approximations and components
but also to other factors that were not considered in the
GLEAM model because of lack of data at the time of the
predictions or because they would require country-specific
implementation in the model. An example is provided by
the case of France, where the beginning of the exponential
increase of the incidence curve in fall 2009 was interrupted
by a sudden drop [96], corresponding to a countrywide
school break of 2 weeks (during weeks 43 and 44), consis-
tent with the results observed from the analysis of the tim-
ing of holidays and from 21 years of French surveillance
data of ILI [97]. The fact that the peak appeared 2 weeks
later than predicted by the model may thus be explained
by the delaying effect produced by the school holiday.
This and other effects, although they could be implemen-
ted in the model through explicit or effective means,
would require the collection of country-specific data
worldwide for a large spectrum of events. Although we
performed simulations with explicit travel drops and vacci-
nation campaigns at the country level as they took place in
reality (see previous and next subsection), the inclusion of
country-specific additional factors, such as school holidays,
were beyond the scope of this study.
Calibration of GLEAM based on the chronological data
of the H1N1 invasion up to 18 June 2009 was able to pro-
vide accurate predictions (2 to 4 months in advance) of
the timing of the peak activity in countries in the northern
hemisphere (Figure 5, Figure 6). This information pro-
vided additional support for the evaluation of real-time
Table 4 Correlation of population variables and epidemic statistics as seen and predicted by the model.
Full dataset
Epidemic statistic Population variable Correlation observed in real dataa Correlation predicted by the modela
r P r P
Worldwide
Peak week Air traffic to/from North America -0.30 0.042 -0.30 0.044
Peak week Longitudeb 0.27 0.071 0.42 0.003
Peak week Latitudeb -0.15 0.317 0.02 0.882
Peak week Vaccine uptake -0.37 0.069 -0.38 0.060
Attack rate reduction, % Vaccine uptake 0.73 < 0.001
European countries only
Peak week Intra-EU air traffic -0.15 0.391 -0.48 0.003
Peak week Air traffic to/from North America -0.26 0.151 -0.37 0.003
Peak week Longitudeb 0.54 < 0.001 0.74 < 0.001
Peak week Latitudeb -0.32 0.07 -0.23 0.178
Peak week Vaccine uptake -0.29 0.204 -0.28 0.212
Attack rate reduction, % Vaccine uptake 0.69 < 0.001
aValues of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r, along with the corresponding P value, were measured between the epidemic statistics and the population
variables of the countries appearing in Figure 5.
bLongitude and latitude are those of the capital city of the country.
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interventions aimed at mitigating the pandemic [68], and
was made available to public-health policymakers to
provide guidance for strategic planning. In addition, the
large-scale extent of this approach enabled predictions for
countries not usually considered by other modeling
approaches that require large detailed datasets to build syn-
thetic populations, and described their behavior at the indi-
vidual level. Other than the USA [7,13,22,24,98], specific
European countries [12,15], or the European continent as a
whole [8], other developed countries do not appear in
modeling studies, and underdeveloped countries have been
considered in agent-based models in only a few cases, such
as in pandemic preparedness studies that focused on Thai-
land with regard to the possible emergence of a pandemic
from the H5N1 avian flu virus [11,24].
Spatial resolution analysis
To test the reliability of the GLEAM model on a smaller
geographical scale and in countries with heterogeneous
climatic structures, we validated the baseline SFO for two
countries, India and Canada, for which there are no spe-
cific models available and which are characterized by
their large geographical extension. Furthermore, the cou-
pling between the different regions of those countries is
complicated by the presence of different seasonal areas
within the same country (in the case of India) and by a
highly structured population with a large extension of
inhabited areas (in the case of Canada). We expected this
to have a strong effect on the timing of the pandemic
activity peak [9].
India is roughly halved by the Tropic of Cancer. Based
on information from the Indian surveillance system, we
identified three regions in the country: northern, south-
ern, and central India (see map in Figure 7A). Northern
India belongs to the northern hemisphere, where the sea-
sonality rescaling function modulates the reproductive
number (Figure S2), whereas southern India is a tropical
region, where the reproductive number is fixed to its
Figure 6 Statistical association between the predicted and observed activity peaks. Peak week as simulated by the model in the baseline
stochastic forecast output (SFO) set with amin = 0.65 versus the peak week observed by surveillance systems in the countries outlined in Figure 5. The
reference ranges of the simulated peak week were obtained by analysis of 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model. In the inset, we show the box plot
indicating the distribution of the differences between the simulated peak week for the baseline SFO set with amin = 0.65, and the observed peak week.
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reference value R0. Central India is crossed by the Tropic
of Cancer, and therefore extends into both seasonal
regions. Given this subdivision of the country into large
regions, we examined in more detail the situation of
eight large Indian cities for which influenza surveillance
data were available. The pandemic wave peaked first in
the cities in central and southern India, between August
and October, whereas northern Indian cities experienced
the activity peak later, in November and December
(Figure 7A). Concerning the reference SFO results, the
six cities in central and southern India are characterized
by much wider reference ranges than those typically
found for cities and countries in the northern hemi-
sphere. This is due to the lack of seasonal forcing, which
Figure 7 Peak timing in India and Canada: simulations and real data. (A) Peak weeks of the epidemic activity in the baseline stochastic
forecast output (SFO) (gray) for eight Indian cities, ordered by decreasing latitude from top to bottom. Right: map of India, showing the Indian
population distribution and the subdivision in North, South, and Central regions. (B) Peak weeks of the epidemic activity in the baseline SFO
(gray) for seven Canadian provinces, ordered eastward from top to bottom. Right: map of Canada, where the Canadian provinces under study
are highlighted in red. The 95% reference ranges of the simulated peak week were obtained by analysis of 2,000 stochastic realizations of the
model for three different values of the seasonal rescaling factor, amin = 0.6, 0.65, and 0.7. The peak weeks reported by the surveillance are
shown as color gradients, whose limits correspond to the time interval where an incidence of greater than 80% of the maximum incidence was
observed. Both maps were made exclusively for this manuscript and are not subject to copyright.
Tizzoni et al. BMC Medicine 2012, 10:165
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/10/165
Page 17 of 31
generally reduces stochastic effects and thus provides a
smaller reference range for the SFO datasets. However,
the timing reproduced by GLEAM simulations was able
to capture the early wave observed in central and south-
ern India, which was then followed by the later peak of
activity experienced in the cities of Jaipur and Delhi,
which belong to the northern hemisphere. The SFO
seems to indicate that the real mobility and population
data integrated into the model are sufficient to provide
useful information on the timing of the pandemic within
the country, although the error bars for the results cov-
ered a duration of 4 to 6 weeks. At the national level, the
aggregation of the pandemic waves experienced in the
different regions at different times resulted in a double
peak of the total incidence curve, as reported by the
Indian surveillance system. In our reference SFO set, the
incidence curve of India presented a double peak in more
than 90% of the stochastic realizations of the model,
reproducing the same seasonal pattern observed in reality
(see Figure S3 for a detailed analysis of the prediction at
the national level).
By contrast, Canada falls completely within the northern
hemisphere, where the seasonal rescaling function modu-
lates the value of R0, leading to higher transmissibility
rates during wintertime. The Canadian case is of interest
because the country has one of the lowest population den-
sities in the world, and is characterized by a largely hetero-
geneous geographical distribution, with cities mainly
scattered along the border with the USA, and varying den-
sities from west to east. Despite the synchronization effect
of epidemic waves produced by seasonal rescaling, the het-
erogeneous population distribution in a vast area leaves
room for an important role of the mobility pattern in
shaping the timing of the arrival of the epidemic and its
peak activity in different regions. We collected the weekly
incidence data reported by the surveillance systems of
seven Canadian provinces (Alberta, British Columbia,
Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Quebec, and
Ontario, which account for more than 94% of the Cana-
dian population), and compared the observed activity peak
with the simulated peak in our baseline SFO. The pan-
demic activity peaked between the end of October and the
end of November (weeks 43 to 47), with the timing over
all regions spanning an entire month, and with the pre-
sence of narrow to broad peaks in the incidence profiles,
as shown, for instance, by the cases of New Brunswick and
Manitoba, respectively (Figure 7B). The 95% reference
ranges of the peak week in our reference SFO simulations
were in good agreement with the surveillance data, and
were able to reproduce a variation in the timing of the
peak occurrence across the country. This is a result of the
interplay of the region’s connection to the rest of
the world where the epidemic was unfolding, and the
intra-country connections and population distribution that
drove the local epidemic propagation and internal cou-
pling across regions due to local mobility. As expected,
those regions that are better connected to the rest of the
world through international travel flows of passengers
experienced the peak earlier, with the exception of New
Brunswick, which synchronized with the early timing of
the peak; this may be explained by the large commuting
flows from New Brunswick to the neighboring regions [3].
For the sake of completeness, we also provide a validation
of the model results for Mexico, with a breakdown by
Mexican region (see Additional file 1G).
The effect of vaccination on peak timing
Although generally implemented too late to affect the
timing of the pandemic in the northern hemisphere, the
reactive vaccination campaigns implemented by several
countries in that region might have helped to accelerate
the decline of the pandemic and reduce its final attack
rate. We considered the data available for 2010 on the
start and coverage of the vaccination campaigns in those
countries in which this measure was implemented, in
order to calculate the daily distribution of vaccines and
provide a more realistic description of the interventions
adopted worldwide. The final vaccine uptake differed
widely between countries in the northern hemisphere,
ranging from 0.6% of the population in the Czech Repub-
lic to about half of the population or more in the north-
ern European countries (Sweden, Finland, Iceland,
Norway) and in Canada, thus resulting in a very hetero-
geneous picture (Table 2). Notwithstanding the large
uptakes reached in some countries, the effect of the mass
vaccination campaigns on the timing of the epidemic was
negligible, as would be anticipated in the case of an early-
peak scenario [68], because most of the vaccine doses
were not deployed before November 2009. We integrated
those data into the reference SFO dataset by generating a
reference + vaccination dataset. We calculated the differ-
ence in the median value of the peak week between the
reference + vaccination dataset and the reference SFO
dataset for the 500 busiest transportation hubs worldwide
and for a single seasonality value of amin = 0.65 (Figure 8).
For all geographical locations, the difference in peak time
between the reference + vaccination dataset and the refer-
ence SFO was no more than 1 day, with no significant
changes in those countries with a larger fraction of immu-
nized individuals.
The real data and the model output provided similar
results, as expressed in terms of a negative correlation,
which was not significant, between the peak week and
the vaccine uptake (Table 4), indicating a larger uptake
in those countries that experienced an earlier pandemic
wave, such as Canada and the USA.
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Clinical attack rate and the effects of vaccination and pre-
exposure immunity
The comparison of the absolute values of predicted
attack rates with real data was hampered by the limited
availability of accurate data on the total number of people
infected by the 2009 H1N1 pandemic worldwide [99].
Surveillance data usually rely on the measure of the num-
ber of individuals with ILI symptoms who seek medical
care, which leads to underestimation of the number of
clinical cases because it does not account for those indi-
viduals with influenza who do not seek medical attention.
By adjusting for consultation rates, current estimates of
the epidemic size range from 1.8% for symptomatic cases
in the UK [89], to 18% in France for the overall propor-
tion of the infected population [100], to about 14% to
29% of the illness attack rate in the USA [101]. The large
variation in these estimates is related to the intrinsic
under-ascertainment of surveillance systems and to dif-
ferent healthcare-seeking behaviors, which may vary
from country to country and may also change in time
within the same population [89-91]. Additional estimates
of the extent of the infection in a population were pro-
vided by serological analyses conducted during and
immediately after the pandemic wave. Available studies
measured overall attack rates of 19% in the UK during
the first wave [78] and 36% after the second wave [102];
21.5% in the USA, from data collected till early December
2009 [103]; and 11% in Hong Kong, from a survey run-
ning to the end of December 2009 [104]. However, these
results are difficult to interpret given the sampling and
timing biases of the serological analyses. However, the
available evidence suggests that the incidence figures ori-
ginally provided during and immediately after the out-
break dramatically underestimated the true number of
overall infections [38,78,102].
In our model, the value of the attack rate depends on
parameters that were prospectively unavailable for real-
time forecast. The final epidemic size is non-trivially
affected by the time and type of implementation of vacci-
nation campaigns, by the level of pre-exposure immunity
in the population, and by the proportions of asympto-
matic infections, all information that became available
only after the pandemic wave ended.
In an a posteriori analysis, we compared the figures esti-
mated by the US Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) for the clinical attack rate in the USA [101]
with the simulated results obtained by the reference SFO
set and the pre-exposure immunity SFO set (Figure 9),
both with reactive vaccination considered as intervention
and the proportion of asymptomatic infections, pa, as 45%.
For this, we followed the evidence provided by a few stu-
dies that showed how symptomatic infections in the
Figure 8 Peak timing: effect of vaccination campaigns. Difference in the median peak weeks in the reference stochastic forecast output
(SFO) set with mass vaccination campaigns and the reference SFO set as a function of the median peak week in the reference SFO set, for the
500 busiest airports of the world. Dots are color-coded according to the corresponding airport’s climatic zone. In the inset, we show the box
plot indicating the distribution of the differences (in days) between the peak weeks of the two SFO sets. The differences were all limited to the
minimal time scale used in the model (1 day) and thus were indistinguishable from stochastic fluctuations.
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H1N1 pandemic might have been less frequent than the
rates known for seasonal influenza strains [62,63] (see
Additional file 1, Figure S6, for results using pa = 33%).
We also calculated the estimated clinical attack rate for
a selected number of countries in the northern hemi-
sphere that implemented mass vaccination campaigns
(Figure 10). Overall, the model SFO for the attack rates
was higher than the values reported by serological ana-
lyses and several surveillance systems. However, they
were close to the values estimated by surveillance systems
in the USA and those provided by other modeled find-
ings, which predicted 22%, 31%, and 48% of clinical
attack rates for the USA [105], Italy [106], and France
[100], respectively, in a scenario corresponding to our
reference SFO set with vaccination. At the same time,
sample sizes of several published serological studies were
found to be too small to assess the validity of model pre-
dictions, except when large values of R0 were considered
[107]. Therefore, it is difficult to make a direct compari-
son between the model results and currently available
serological analyses. Furthermore, attack rates larger than
those produced by agent-based models [105,106] have to
be expected, because of the homogeneous assumption
considered in the GLEAM model for the epidemic
dynamics in each subpopulation. This issue has already
been specifically addressed in a side-by-side comparison
of GLEAM with an agent-based model simulating a pan-
demic-like event in Italy [42]. The results showed a sys-
tematic difference in the epidemic size of the two
models, but without affecting the timing of the simulated
epidemic.
While the reference + vaccination case allowed direct
comparison of the model results with the available empiri-
cal data, the flexibility of the model also allowed us to
assess the extent to which each component and/or inter-
vention might affect the attack rate. The results of the pre-
vious subsection showed how massive vaccination
campaigns had a very limited effect on the timing of the
pandemic peak; however, the model predictions showed
that their effect on the final attack rates was non-negligible
[105], particularly in those countries where an early start
was possible (Figure 11A, B). Overall, a significant positive
correlation between vaccine uptake and a reduction in the
final attack rate was evident in the model results (Table 4).
As expected, the largest reductions in the set with vaccina-
tion were found for those countries that adopted prompt
and rapid administration of vaccines (the USA, Hungary,
and Sweden). In these cases, vaccination was able to
achieve a relative reduction ranging from about 8% to
16%, if we consider the upper value of the reference range.
Figure 9 Clinical attack rate in the USA. The number of clinical A/H1N1 cases in the 2009 pandemic as estimated by the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (gray) and by two different stochastic forecast output (SFO) sets simulated by the Global Epidemic and Mobility
(GLEAM) computational model, at six different dates between April 2009 and March 2010. The simulated results corresponded to the reference
SFO set with vaccination and to the pre-exposure immunity SFO set with vaccinations, with the proportion of asymptomatic infections, pa, set to
45%. The bar indicates the median value and the error bar indicates the corresponding 95% reference range.
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A late start or a slow pace of vaccine distribution would be
predicted to result in a much smaller reduction, as shown
by the cases of Italy, the Czech Republic, and Norway,
which were characterized by a low final uptake (Italy and
Czech Republic) and/or late start to the vaccination cam-
paign (Czech Republic and Norway). The average relative
reduction obtained by considering all countries was 3.6%.
However, it is important to note that estimates in reduc-
tions in the final attack rate from vaccinations are limited
by the fact that the model does not incorporate age-speci-
fic transmission and vaccination strategies, therefore, the
effect of vaccinations on a given age group could differ
greatly from the average reduction in the final attack rate
observed at the country level.
If we consider that a portion of the population had an
initial degree of immunity, provided by cross-reacting anti-
bodies elicited by previously circulating seasonal strains
(see Methods section), the relative reduction in the final
size of the epidemic increases considerably. We assessed
the relative reduction obtained by comparing the pre-expo-
sure immunity SFO set in which vaccination had also been
implemented (that is, pre-exposure immunity + vaccina-
tion) with the reference SFO set (Figure 11C; also consid-
ered as a benchmark for the results shown in Figure 11B).
Figure 10 Clinical attack rates in the northern hemisphere. Estimated clinical attack rate of 26 selected countries in the northern hemisphere
for the reference stochastic forecast output (SFO) set coupled with mass vaccination campaigns, and the pre-exposure immunity SFO set with
vaccinations, both assuming a proportion of asymptomatic infections, pa, of 45%. The box plots indicate the 95% and 50% reference ranges, with
the median value of the simulated attack rates obtained by the analysis of 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model for amin being 0.65.
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A new MCML calibration that integrated data on pre-
exposure immunity had to be performed to generate the
corresponding set of SFO, because the initial conditions of
the immunity profile of the population were changed with
respect to the other SFO sets. Although this change did
not affect the timing of the pandemic wave (Figure S5), the
presence of pre-exposure immunity in older age groups
reduced the effect of the disease in that population, in
agreement with other modeling studies [100,106]. The
values of the relative reduction increased by a factor of
approximately 2 with respect to the reference + vaccination
case for those countries experiencing the largest benefit
from the massive vaccination campaigns (for example,
USA, Hungary, and Sweden), and were considerably (about
one order of magnitude) higher for the countries in which
this benefit was extremely limited in the absence of pre-
exposure immunity (for example, Czech Republic, Italy,
and Norway). The relative variation is an overall result of
the effects related to the start of the vaccination campaigns,
peak timing, and the population distribution by age for
each country owing to the pre-exposure immunity in older
age groups. For instance, smaller reductions were seen in
countries characterized by relatively young age profiles,
such as Turkey and Tunisia.
Antiviral treatment and pre-vaccination
During the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic, only a few countries
adopted the systematic use of antiviral drugs as a mitiga-
tion strategy: Canada, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, Japan,
the UK, and the USA [82]. Furthermore, in those coun-
tries, the antiviral treatment was limited to the early
stage of the outbreak, and the effort was not sustained in
the later stages of the pandemic.
In the model, we considered the intervention applied
to all countries having drug stockpiles available at the
beginning of the outbreak [74], and for each country, we
assumed this would occur until the country’s stockpile
was depleted. Antiviral treatment was considered in iso-
lation on top of the reference SFO, and no vaccination
was implemented. It should be noted that this is a ‘what
if’ scenario informed by the data on antiviral stockpiles
around the world.
We examined the hypothetical effect on the simulated
activity peak times for a set of countries that adopted sys-
tematic antiviral treatments (Figure 12). Delays of about 3
to 4 weeks were obtained in all cases, assuming a systematic
detection rate 30% for patients with influenza, with prompt
administration of the drug. If compared with the start dates
of the vaccination campaigns (Table 2), this slowing-down
effect would have provided valuable time to immunize a
larger fraction of the population before the pandemic wave
reached its peak in those countries. A combination of anti-
viral treatment and mass vaccination campaigns would
achieve much lower attack rates [68] at the end of the epi-
demic. However, assuming a lower and more realistic
detection rate of clinical cases (5% or 10%), the delay in the
pandemic peak would be only 1 to 2 weeks [68], allowing
less time for implementing vaccination campaigns.
Moreover, the trade-off between the severity of the
infection and the risk of inducing antiviral resistance has
to be factored into the final decision considering the
implementation of systematic treatment policies. In this
hypothetical scenario, we considered the antiviral efficacy
for transmission and reduction of the infectious period as
that available in the modeling literature. As discussed in
the Methods section, we acknowledge that there is an
ongoing debate on the availability of the empirical evi-
dence supporting these estimates [73].
We also evaluated the effectiveness of further hypothe-
tical mitigation strategies by assuming vaccination had
Figure 11 Cumulative attack rate: effect of vaccination campaigns and pre-exposure immunity. (A) Final vaccine uptake as a function of
the mass vaccination starting date for the countries of the northern hemisphere (reported in Table 2). (B) Relative reduction of the final
epidemic size in the reference stochastic forecast output (SFO) coupled with mass vaccination campaigns, with respect to the reference SFO, as
a function of the final vaccine uptake. (C) Relative reduction of the final epidemic size in the pre-exposure immunity SFO coupled with
vaccination campaigns, with respect to the reference SFO, as a function of the final uptake. The relative reduction of the epidemic size was
calculated as the relative reduction of the maximum of the 95% reference range, obtained from 2,000 stochastic realizations, in the reference
SFO set. In all SFO sets, we assumed the proportion of asymptomatic infections, pa, to be 33%.
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occurred before the epidemic onset [11,12,28] in different
proportions of the population. Unlike the full immunity
assumed in the pre-exposure immunity SFO (’all-or-
nothing’), we considered here the same compartmentali-
zation and assumptions as in the case of reactive vaccina-
tion, with relative efficacies against infection, and against
transmission and development of clinical illness once
infected (see Methods section). The GLEAM simulation
results showed that a relative reduction of between 77%
and more than 99% of the clinical attack rate would be
achieved if 50% of the population were pre-vaccinated,
thus successfully mitigating the epidemic spread. Smaller
uptakes, of 20% and 30% of the population, would lead to
relative reductions in the ranges of 20% to 28% and of
34% to 50%, respectively (Table 5).
Sensitivity analysis on the epidemiological parameters
In this analysis, we explored the effects induced by
changes in the values of the epidemiological parameters
considered in the model, including assumptions and
estimated values. First, we focused on the sinusoidal
rescaling of the reproductive number to account for sea-
sonal effects. We assumed a different setting in which
the maximum value of the rescaling function, amax, was
set to 1 [4,9] instead of 1.1 [2,108] thus, the maximum
value reached by a(t)R0 in the temperate regions during
wintertime is equal to the reference value of the repro-
ductive number in the Tropics, R0.
We computed the shift induced in the median peak
week by considering the amax = 1 scenario, compared
with the reference SFO set where amax = 1.1, for the 500
busiest airports in the database (Figure 13; the color
codes indicate the climate region of each airport). The
change in the value produced a delay in the activity peak
of every country that was never greater than 3 weeks,
with 98.6% of the airports experiencing a delay of
2 weeks at most, and only countries in the southern
hemisphere witnessing a delay exceeding 2 weeks. Given
that delays of less than 2 weeks are within the reference
range of our simulation results for the reference SFO set,
this change would have a limited effect on the validity of
our predictions for the timing of the pandemic wave in
the northern hemisphere (Figure 5).
Second, we investigated the role of our estimate of the
seasonal effects from the initial pandemic international
invasion. Instead of estimating the value of amin in the
range of 0.6 to 0.7 from the correlation procedure
described in the calibration subsection, we assumed amin
= 0.1, as in the case of seasonal influenza [9]. In this case,
the simulations predicted an epidemic peak at the begin-
ning of 2010 for almost all countries in the northern
hemisphere, thus resulting in a delay of about 1.5 months
Figure 12 Peak timing: effect of interventions by antiviral treatment. Peak weeks of the epidemic activity in the reference stochastic
forecast output (SFO) (gray) and in the antiviral scenario (red), for a set of countries in the northern hemisphere. The 95% reference ranges of
the simulated peak week were obtained by analysis of 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model for three different values of the seasonal
rescaling factor, amin: 0.6, 0.65, and 0.7.
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with respect to the initial predictions of the baseline case
(Figure S7). These results highlight the importance of
obtaining a correct estimate of the strength of seasonal
effects in order to provide accurate predictions.
Finally, we also investigated the effect of changes in the
assumed parameters concerning asymptomatic infec-
tions, that is, the relative fraction of asymptomatic cases,
pa and their relative transmissibility, rb. A broad explora-
tion of parameters and a thorough sensitivity analysis has
been provided in a previous study [2]. For the sake of
completeness, we provide an enlarged sensitivity analysis
of the parameter rb (see Additional file 1K), which is gen-
erally assumed in modeling studies to be equal to 50%
[23,24,27]. We found that the predictions obtained in the
baseline SFO set for the timing of the pandemic influenza
peak and the illness attack rate were very robust against
changes of rb, even in the extreme case of rb = 10%
(Figure S8).
Sensitivity analysis of data knowledge and integration
The sensitivity analysis of most epidemic models focuses
only on the parameters describing the disease. However,
in a large-scale computational model, the integration and
assimilation of data on census, mobility, and other demo-
graphic factors has to deal with issues related to the qual-
ity and completeness of the data. The sensitivity analysis
of the model results with regard to the incompleteness or
poor quality of those ‘structural’ data is thus extremely
important. We tested this aspect by assessing whether
the full complexity of the real mobility data considered in
GLEAM would be essential to obtain the SFO presented
in the previous subsection, or if a simplified version of
the model would allow similar results.
Other approaches have considered only one transpor-
tation mode (air travel) and included a limited number
of airports, ranging from 52 to 500 [4,6,9,14,29,43]. A
recent study compared the spread of influenza at the
Table 5 Effects of pre-vaccination.
Country Relative reduction in epidemic size, %a
Pre-vaccination 20% Pre-vaccination 30% Pre-vaccination 50%
China 27.3 to 28.2 46.3 to 48.2 98.9 to 99.3
Hungary 23.2 to 24.4 38.6 to 39.2 87.9 to 90.0
United States 20.5 to 21.8 35.2 to 36.2 92.4 to 95.5
Canada 21.5 to 22.6 37.5 to 38.3 93.4 to 95.6
Italy 23.0 to 24.4 38.3 to 39.0 90.2 to 91.8
Japan 23.4 to 26.8 38.1 to 40.1 85.5 to 89.8
Israel 22.9 to 24.8 37.8 to 38.8 84.3 to 86.4
France 22.0 to 24.2 36.6 to 38.1 84.4 to 86.8
Sweden 23.1 to 24.8 38.2 to 39.0 86.3 to 88.6
UK 22.2 to 24.6 36.6 to 38.4 84.7 to 88.4
Germany 22.6 to 24.2 37.7 to 38.6 88.9 to 90.6
Portugal 22.7 to 24.5 37.1 to 38.6 88.3 to 92.4
Finland 22.9 to 24.7 37.7 to 38.7 84.5 to 87.3
Austria 21.6 to 23.5 35.8 to 37.1 81.7 to 84.1
Ireland 22.0 to 24.0 36.2 to 37.6 83.0 to 86.6
Denmark 21.5 to 23.5 35.6 to 37.1 81.7 to 85.0
Turkey 26.5 to 27.0 46.4 to 49.6 95.4 to 95.8
Iceland 20.6 to 24.8 33.9 to 38.6 78.8 to 87.8
Belgium 23.2 to 24.8 38.6 to 39.4 89.1 to 91.1
Slovenia 21.5 to 23.3 35.3 to 36.8 76.4 to 81.1
Netherlands 21.7 to 24.7 36.3 to 38.4 85.5 to 89.5
Switzerland 21.0 to 24.0 34.4 to 36.8 77.5 to 81.9
Spain 22.4 to 23.7 37.7 to 39.0 91.7 to 93.7
Greece 23.2 to 24.8 38.6 to 39.5 86.1 to 87.7
Tunisia 24.5 to 25.7 41.0 to 42.1 90.9 to 92.0
Czech Republic 24.8 to 25.6 42.0 to 44.9 89.7 to 90.6
Norway 23.1 to 24.7 37.9 to 38.9 85.9 to 88.7
aRelative reduction of the epidemic size, using different hypothetical pre-vaccination scenarios, in the countries of the northern hemisphere in which vaccines
were available during the 2009 to 2010 winter season. The relative reduction in the epidemic size was calculated as the relative reduction of the maximum of
the 95% reference range, obtained from 2,000 stochastic realizations, in the reference stochastic forecast output set.
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global level by considering different samples obtained
from the full OAG (Official Airline Guide) [52] database
of 2000 [41]. Its results have shown that samples of the
200 to 300 largest airports in the world would repro-
duce fairly well the backbone of spreading at the global
and regional scales. Although we agree with previous
studies which state that considering partial datasets is
informative for the overall theoretical analysis of general
spreading features, we tested the performance of partial
datasets in providing reliable SFO sets at the country or
city scale.
We performed the simulations of the 2009 A/H1N1
pandemic on a version of GLEAM that integrated a partial
dataset restricted to the top 500 worldwide transportation
hubs, ranked by their traffic, with no short-range mobility
considered. This greatly reduced the geographic extension
of the model, and unfortunately, most of the top 500 air-
ports lie in Europe and North America, with very few
belonging to African countries. Of 220 countries, only 126
were within the reach of the model, thus corresponding to
a 43% drop from the full GLEAM model. We report a
breakdown by continent of the countries that can still be
analyzed using only 500 airports (Table 6). The simula-
tions considered the reference SFO set both in the mobi-
lity-sampled and the original versions of the GLEAM
model.
Because this analysis modified the structure of the
model, we performed a new calibration, using a new esti-
mate of the reproductive number (R0) of 1.5, and a value
of amin in the range 0.8 to 0.9. The calibration procedure
was still based on the same dataset of arrival times used
in the reference SFO set, because the corresponding
countries were covered by the sampled mobility network.
As a consequence of the low transmissibility and the
small seasonal effect, the spread of the pandemic on the
sampled network appeared to be faster in the northern
hemisphere, leading to an earlier activity peak for most of
the airports, except for a few cases, which showed a delay
of up to 4 weeks compared with the full database scenario,
because of their reduced connectivity in the sampled net-
work (Figure 14). The largest airports in Europe and
North America, such as Paris in France and Atlanta in the
USA, experienced the largest shift in the activity peak, ran-
ging from 20 to 45 days earlier than the corresponding
timing of the SFO that integrated the full dataset. In the
southern hemisphere and the Tropics, the activity peak
was postponed with respect to the reference SFO set. For
large airports, the delay was limited to 2 weeks, as shown
in the cases of Santiago in Chile and Buenos Aires in
Argentina; however, for some less connected airports,
such as Shenzhen in China and Campinas in Brazil, the
delay in the influenza activity peak was 45 days.
Figure 13 Peak timing: effect of changes in the maximum seasonal rescaling. Difference in the median peak weeks in the reference
stochastic forecast output (SFO) set, with amax = 1.1 and amax = 1.0, for the 500 busiest airports, as a function of the median peak week in the
reference SFO set. Dots are color-coded according to the corresponding airport’s climate zone. In the inset, we show the box plot indicating the
distribution of the differences (in days) between the peak week of the reference SFO set and the SFO set with amax = 1.0. Differences were fairly
limited and generally fell within a period of 2 weeks.
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Although the top 500 airports gather about 80% of the
worldwide air traffic, the differences in the median peak
times are clearly non-negligible (Figure 14). A specific
application to a real-world epidemic is thus able to show
how the global backbone of invasion can be strongly
affected by the partial sampling of the mobility network,
owing to the interplay of different parameters, such as
the presence of loops, local connectivity, seasonal effects,
and the real and effective (that is, measured on the
sampled network) distance of the location from the seed
of the outbreak. In addition, a limited version of the
model may not be applicable to a specific real epidemic,
given its partial coverage of the locations and countries
in the world, as would be the case where the initial seed
of the outbreak belongs to a region not included in the
data integrated into the model. Indeed, in the top 500 air-
ports, the sampling of the mobility network restricts the
choice of the seed location to Mexico City, which is the
major airport found close to the original outbreak loca-
tion. Therefore, the results (Figure 14) are affected by the
Table 6 Geographic resolution of GLEAM with the full database and with the top 500 airports.
Continent Countries in the full database, n Countries in the top 500 database, n Relative reduction, %
Asia 44 36 18
Europe 45 31 31
Americas 49 32 35
Africa 56 20 64
Oceania 26 7 73
Figure 14 Peak timing: effect of sampling of the mobility network limited to the top 500 airports. Difference in the median peak weeks
in the reference stochastic forecast output (SFO) set, where the full mobility dataset was considered, and the top 500 scenario, for the 500
busiest airports, as a function of the median peak week in the reference SFO set. Dots are color-coded according to the corresponding airport’s
climate zone. In the inset, we show the box plot indicating the distribution of the differences (in days) between the peak week of the reference
SFO set and the SFO set considering only the top 500 airports. The differences were considerable, with median differences of about 3 weeks.
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following two effects, which occur because of the restric-
tion of the analysis to the top 500 airports: the change in
the mobility network structure and the change in the
seed location, as forced by the lack of resolution in the
sampled mobility network. For this reason, we analyzed
the change in peak time as a function of the initial condi-
tion in Mexico City in the case of the full mobility net-
work (see Additional file 1L). The results showed how
the reduction of the full mobility dataset has considerable
consequences on the timing of the pandemic in the
various locations discounted of the effects induced by
the initial condition resolution. Overall, the peak time
shift between the full database scenario and the sampled
database scenario, which both had the seed in Mexico
City, ranged from 69 days earlier up to 20 days later
(Figure S9).
To examine the effects of further model simplifications,
we also explored the results of our simulations after the
removal of mobility connections between the European
countries, keeping the structure of the model untouched in
the rest of the world. This led to a systematic delay in the
peak of activity in all European countries compared with
the full model, because the removal of intra-European
Union (EU) connections meant that the only possible
source of infection could be from outside the EU. The
delay in median values of the peak time ranged from 1
week to 9 weeks (Figure 15A), and was strongly correlated
with the travel flows of passengers flying into a given coun-
try from outside Europe (Figure 15B). Countries with a
small extra-EU traffic fraction, such as Norway, Slovakia,
Croatia, and Slovenia, experienced the largest delay. On
the other side of the spectrum, some countries, such as the
UK and France (not shown) experienced negligible or no
changes, because their primary source of infection was
from North America.
Conclusions
In this study, we examined the application of GLEAM, a
global stochastic simulation model of epidemic spread
based on real data of human population distribution and
mobility, to the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic. We analyzed, in
real time, the pandemic emergency that led to the publica-
tion in summer 2009 of the predicted timing for the pan-
demic wave in the countries in the northern hemisphere
for the fall/winter period. Using surveillance data from
various monitoring and virologic sources, we have pro-
vided a validation of the SFO of the GLEAM model for
the unfolding of the A/H1N1 pandemic in 2009. Our find-
ings indicate very good agreement in the predicted timing
for a large variety of countries, including those with under-
developed surveillance schemes, and for intra-country spa-
tial scales. The results are encouraging in advocating the
Figure 15 Peak timing: effect of intra-EU mobility connections. (A) Delay of the A/H1N1 pandemic peak time in the scenario with no intra-
EU air connections, with respect to the reference stochastic forecast output (SFO) set, for 22 European countries. (B) Map of Europe, showing for
each country the fraction of traffic directed to and from non-European countries. Countries with small extra-European connections experienced
the largest delay in the A/H1N1 pandemic peak time. The map was made exclusively for this manuscript and is not subject to copyright.
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use of large-scale computational approaches in providing
real-time forecast and scenarios of epidemic outbreaks. If
the appropriate MCML calibration is performed, the SFOs
are very stable against changes in epidemiological para-
meters that are difficult to estimate for an emerging virus,
such as the asymptomatic proportion of the population
and its relative infectiousness. Changes in those parameters
are generally absorbed by the rescaling of the key disease
parameters in a self-consistent way. However, the model
output shows strong dependence on the accuracy of the
initial conditions and the mobility network considered.
This highlights the need for a detailed level of description
of human mobility and population distribution in the
world in order to achieve reliable predictions at a high-
resolution scale. We also considered additional scenarios to
allow more realistic simulation of the pandemic event
worldwide, based on detailed data of country-based inter-
ventions and population initial immunity profiles, which
became available throughout and after the outbreak. Con-
sequently, accurate data should be rapidly available during
the initial phase of the outbreak in order to allow careful
calibration of the model, and close collaboration with pub-
lic-health officials should allow careful consideration of
possible intervention scenarios to support policy decisions
for contingency planning at both country and global levels.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Real-time numerical forecasts of global epidemic
spreading: case study of 2009 A/H1N1pdm. Supporting Information.
List of data sources and sensitivity analyses on model’s structure and
epidemic parameters.
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